CIKM'21 Tutorial

Adversarial Robustness of Deep Learning: Theory, Algorithms, and Applications

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Adversarial Attacks

Defence through Adversarial Training

Verification in Practice

Conclusions and Future Directions





Adversarial Attacks

Algorithms for Adversarial Attacks More Examples of Adversarial Attacks

Defence through Adversarial Training


Adversarial Training Distributional Robustness Robustness vs Generalisation

Verification in Practice

Conclusions and Future Directions







Deep learning models are pervasively applied in many safety-critical systems!



Deep Learning in Safety-Critical Systems

nature reviews drug discovery

Review Article | Published: 11 April 2019

Applications of machine learning in drug discovery and development

Jessica Vamathevan 🖂, Dominic Clark, Paul Czodrowski, Ian Dunham, Edgardo Ferran,

- Drug Discovery and Development
- Automatic Medical Diagnosis

nature International weekly journal of science
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Dermatologist-level classification of skin cancer with deep neural networks Andre Esteva, Brett Kuprel, Roberto A. Novoa, Justin Ko, Susan M. Swetter, Helen M. Blau & Sebastian Thrun





Self-driving Cars

Autonomous Vehicles

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
Researchers and Practitioners may have many concerns...

- How does a deep learning model make a decision?
- Does deep learning always make a correct decision?
- Under what circumstances a deep learning model will make a wrong decision?

Ultimate Question: Can we really trust the decisions made by deep learning models, especially on safety-critical applications?

8

Yet we cannot trust deep learning models, at least not now ...




Simple approach to **fool** deep neural networks: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [Goodfellow et al., 2014]

Goodfellow et al (ICLR 2014). Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples.



Such vulnerabilities are pervasive ...




Misspelled Word



In Deep Medical Systems...

Original Medical Image



Adversarial Medical Image

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Adversarial Examples Against Medical Deep Learning Systems [Finlayson et al., 2019, Finlayson et al., 2018]

Finlayson, Samuel G., et al. "Adversarial attacks on medical machine learning." Science 363.6433 (2019): 1287-1289.

In Autonomous Systems...



DL Classification: Green Light

Changing one pixel



DL Classification: Red Light

Min et al. (Theoretical Computer Science, 2019), A Game-Based Approximate Verification of Deep Neural Networks with Provable Guarantees"

In Medical Record Analysis...

Original Medical Record

There is extremely dense fibrous tissue in the upper outer quadrants of both breasts. This lowers the sensitivity of mammography. B.B. was placed in the region of palpable abnormality and demonstrates dense breast tissue in this region. An occasional benign-appearing calcification is present in both breasts.

Analysis Result: Positive

Record with Two Mis-spelled Words

There is extremely dense fibrous tissue in the upper outer quadrants of both breasts. This lowers the sensitivity of mammography. B.B. was placed in the region of palpable abnormality and demonstrates dense breast <u>tisue</u> in this region. An occasional benign-appearing <u>calcifcaton</u> is present in both breasts.

Analysis Result: Negative

Javid et al. (ACL 2018), Hotflip: White-box adversarial examples for text classification

Adversarial Examples in Running Systems

Fool YOLOv2 Object Detector by a real picture ... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIbFvK2S9g8



Simen et al. (CVPR Workshops 2019), Fooling automated surveillance cameras: adversarial patches to attack person detection



Fool an Object Classifier by a 3-D printed turtle ... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XaQu7kkQBPc



Anish et al. (ICML 2018), Synthesizing Robust Adversarial Examples




- Adversarial Attacks: How to find the weak spots of deep learning models

 — Evaluating adversarial robustness
- ► Adversarial Defense: How to defend adversarial attacks → Improving the robustness w.r.t. adversarial attacks
- Verification: How to verify if a given model satisfies robustness properties for certain input constraints

 \rightarrow Providing robustness guarantees if no counter-examples can be found

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What is Adversarial Example




DL model: classifies α and α' differently Human: should remain the same

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
An Example of Defense



Injecting adversarial examples into training so the resulting DL model is **resistant** to adversarial attacks


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An Example of Verification



This tutorial aims to cover a few **well-established** works from three aspects:

- Adversarial Attacks
- Adversarial Defence (e.g., adversarial training)



Verification

Figure: https://nicholas.carlini.com/writing/2019/ all-adversarial-example-papers.html

Comprehensive one: A Survey of Safety and Trustworthiness of Deep Neural Networks: Verification, Testing, Adversarial Attack and Defence, and Interpretability, Computer Science Review. 37 (2020): 100270.



- ► This video just highlights the **high-level overview** of this tutorial.
- The long version will be presented in CIKM 2021 where the technical details and in-depth contents will be given.
- We have a **dedicated website** for sharing the slides and videos of this tutorial: http://tutorial-cikm.trustai.uk/
- Other related tutorials we already presented can be found in:
 - ECML/PKDD 2021 Tutorial: http://tutorial-ecml.trustai.uk/
 - IJCAI 2021 Tutorial: http://tutorial-ijcai.trustai.uk/
 - ► ICDM 2020 Tutorial: https://tutorial.trustdeeplearning.com/

21



Adversarial Attacks Algorithms for Adversarial Attacks More Examples of Adversarial Attacks

Defence through Adversarial Training

Adversarial Training Distributional Robustness Robustness vs Generalisation

Verification in Practice

Conclusions and Future Directions



Adversarial Attacks




What is Adversarial Example

- Input: DL model f
 A correctly-classified, genuine example α
- Aim: find a perturbed example α' , such that
 - $\blacktriangleright~f$ produces a different decision on α'
 - Human will produce a same decision on α and α'









"airliner" (99%)





Problem: Given a DL model f and genuine example α . find α' such that

 $\blacktriangleright f(\alpha') \neq f(\alpha)$ $\blacktriangleright D_{Human}(\alpha') = D_{Human}(\alpha)$

How to approximate human decision?


Use certain distance metric to assure α' and α are small enough

How to search α' such that $f(\alpha') \neq f(\alpha)$?

Design certain objective functions for minimization

What kind of information is required from DL model f?

White-box v.s. Black-box



25



Targeted Attacks v.s. Un-targeted Attacks

- With a targeted perturbation, the attacker is able to control the resulting misclassification label.
- With an un-targeted perturbation, the attacker can enable the misclassification but cannot control its resulting misclassification label.



Distance metric to measure α' and α :

- ► *L_p*-norm distance
 - $L_p\text{-norm}$ based attacks (e.g., $p=0,2,\infty)$
- Total variation of pixel displacement
 - Spatial-transformed adversarial attacks
- Metrics for measuring similarity of sentences or text
 - Attacks on NLP models



The information is required from DL model f (white-box or black-box):

- ► Hard labels only
- Confidence values
- Model's parameters and structure



The type of the model f:

- Feed-forward neural networks
- Recurrent neural networks
- Graph neural networks
- Other models





Local adversarial attack v.s. Universal adversarial attack

- Local adversarial attack:
 - find specific perturbation for \boldsymbol{each} input
- Universal adversarial attack:
 - find a perturbation that can fool a set of inputs

30



Adversarial Attacks Algorithms for Adversarial Attacks

More Examples of Adversarial Attacks

Defence through Adversarial Training

Distributional Robustness

Robustness vs Generalisation

Verification in Practice

Conclusions and Future Directions



Adversarial Attacks

Algorithms for Adversarial Attacks



Limited-Memory BFGS Attack (L-BFGS)

One of earliest adversarial attack: optimization based formulation with L_2 -norm metric

- Model $f : \mathbb{R}^{s_1} \to \{1 \dots s_K\}$ with s_K labels
- $x \in \mathbb{R}^{s_1} = [0,1]^{s_1}$ is an input
- $t \in \{1 \dots s_K\}$ is a target misclassification label

Find the adversarial perturbation r via

 $\begin{array}{ll} \min ||r||_2 & \text{assure human-decision unchanged} \\ \textit{s.t.} & \arg \max_l f_l(x+r) = t & \text{assure misclassification} \\ & x+r \in \mathbb{R}^{s_1} & \text{assure perturbed image feasible} \end{array}$

(1)

- Solved by L-BFGS, Establish this direction

Christian et al (ICLR 2014). Intriguing properties of neural networks



Fast Gradient Sign Method is able to find adversarial perturbations with a fixed L_{∞} -norm constraint **very efficiently**

- ▶ θ : the model parameters,
- x, y: the input and the label
- ▶ $J(\theta, x, y)$: the loss function

Find adversarial perturbation r by linearizing the loss function around the current value of $\theta_{\rm r}$

$$r = \epsilon \operatorname{sign} \left(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y) \right) \tag{2}$$

- A one-step modification to all pixel values to increase the loss function with a $L_\infty\text{-norm}$ constraint ϵ

Goodfellow et al (ICLR 2015). Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples



C&W Attack

Carlini & Wagner Attack: find adversarial examples with very small distortion, work on L_0,L_2 and $L_\infty\text{-norm}$

- ► x is an input,
- \blacktriangleright r is adversarial perturbation
- \blacktriangleright F is a designed surrogate function such as x+r is able to fool the neural network when it is negative

min
$$\ell(r) = ||r||_p + c \cdot F(x+r)$$
 (3)

- The optimizer Adam was directly adopt to solve this optimization problem
- The key to achieve **strong attack** is a careful design of surrogate function

Nicholas et al (IEEE S&P 2017). Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks

White-box setting: full access to the target model Black-box setting: with limited knowledge on the model

ZOO Attack: Model $F(x) \in [0,1]^K$ (confidence values)

•
$$\min_{x} ||x - x_{0}||_{2}^{2} + c \cdot f(x, t)$$

where $x \in [0, 1]^{p}$ and
 $f(x, t) = max\{-\kappa, max_{i \neq t}[logF(x)]_{i} - [logF(x)]_{t}\}$


 $\begin{array}{l} \blacktriangleright \quad \mbox{Random coordinate gradient descent via estimated gradients by Symmetric} \\ \hline Difference \mbox{Quotient:} \\ \hline \frac{\partial g(x)}{\partial x} \approx \frac{g(x+he) - g(x-he)}{2h} \mbox{ with small } h \end{array}$

- Nearly similar performance to white-box attack
- Key difference: only access confidence values \rightarrow numerically estimate the gradient

Chen et al (ACM Workshop on Al&Security 2017). Zoo: Zeroth order optimization based black-box attacks to deep neural networks without training substitute models attacks to deep neural networks without training substitute models.

Spatially Transformed Adversarial Examples


What else can we modify? Perturb the locations of pixels



 $f^{*} = \arg \min_{f} \mathcal{L}_{adv}(x, f) + \tau \mathcal{L}_{flow}(f) \quad \text{minimize flow}$ $\mathcal{L}_{adv}(x, f) = \max(\max_{i \neq t} g(\mathbf{x}_{adv})_{i} - g(\mathbf{x}_{adv})_{t}, \kappa) \quad \text{surrogate function}$ Measure the pixel displacement: $\mathcal{L}_{flow}(f) = \sum_{n=1}^{pixels} \sum_{q \in \mathcal{N}(p)} \sqrt{||\Delta u^{(p)} - \Delta u^{(q)}||_{2}^{2} + ||\Delta v^{(p)} - \Delta v^{(q)}||_{2}^{2}}$ Perform spatial transformation: $\mathbf{x}_{adv}^{(i)} = \sum_{q \in \mathcal{N}(u^{(i)}, v^{(i)})} \mathbf{x}^{(q)} (1 - |u^{(i)} - u^{(q)}|) (1 - |v^{(i)} - v^{(q)}|)$ $\mathbf{E}_{LIVER}^{\text{UNIVERSITY OF}}$

Spatially Transformed Adversarial Examples

Flow visualization on MNIST: digit "0" is misclassified as "2"




- Instead of perturbing the pixel values, adversarial attacks can be achieved by spatial transformation
- ▶ Different metric is required to measure pixel's **spatial** displacement

Chaowei et al (ICLR 2018). Spatially transformed adversarial examples



Universal Attack via Combined Perturbation


How about perturbing spatial location and pixel values simultaneously on an image set?



- Unified solution: L_p -norm, spatial-transformed, or both
- Universal: a single perturbation fools a set of input images
- Strong transferability: workable across unseen models in a black-box setting



Universal Attack via Combined Perturbation



Yanghao et al (ICDM 2020). Generalizing Universal Adversarial Attacks Beyond Additive
Perturbations
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Introduction

Adversarial Attacks

Algorithms for Adversarial Attacks More Examples of Adversarial Attacks

Defence through Adversarial Training

Adversarial Training Distributional Robustness Robustness vs Generalisation

Verification in Practice

Conclusions and Future Directions



Adversarial Attacks

More Examples of Adversarial Attacks



Adversarial attack on reading comprehension system

Article: Super Bowl 50 Paragraph: "Peyton Manning became the first quarterback ever to lead two different teams to multiple Super Bowls. He is also the oldest quarterback ever to play in a Super Bowl at age 39. The past record was held by John Elway, who led the Broncos to victory in Super Bowl XXXIII at age 38 and is currently Denver's Executive Vice President of Football Operations and General Manager. Quarterback Jeff Dean had jersey number 37 in Champ Bowl XXXIV." Question: "What is the name of the quarterback who was 38 in Super Bowl XXXII?" Original Prediction: John Elway Prediction under adversary: Jeff Dean

- Adding distracting sentences (in blue)

- Prediction changes from correct one (green) to incorrect (red)

Robin et al (EMNLP 2017). Adversarial Examples for Evaluating Reading Comprehension Systems

Edit adversarial attack on sentiment analysis system:

Task: Sentiment Analysis. Classifier: Amazon AWS. Original label: 100% Negative. Adversarial label: 89% Positive.

Text: I watched this movie recently mainly because I am a Huge fan of Jodie Foster's. I saw this movie was made right between her 2 Oscar award winning performances, so my expectations were fairly high. Unfortunately Unf0rtunately, I thought the movie was terrible terrible and I'm still left wondering how she was ever persuaded to make this movie. The script is really weak wea k.

- After editing words (red), prediction changes from 100% of Negative to /bf 89% of Positive.

Li et al (DNSS 2020). TextBugger: Generating Adversarial Text Against Real-world Applications

Adversarial attack on BERT-based sentiment classifier:


Movie Review (Positive (POS) ↔ Negative (NEG))			
Original (Label: NEG)	The characters, cast in impossibly <i>contrived situations</i> , are <i>totally</i> estranged from reality.		
Attack (Label: POS)	The characters, cast in impossibly <i>engineered circumstances</i> , are <i>fully</i> estranged from reality.		
Original (Label: POS)	It cuts to the <i>knot</i> of what it actually means to face your <i>scares</i> , and to ride the <i>overwhelming</i> metaphorical		
Attack (Label: NEG)	wave that life wherever it takes you. It cuts to the <i>core</i> of what it actually means to face your <i>fears</i> , and to ride the <i>big</i> metaphorical wave that life wherever it takes you.		

- Changing a few words completely fools the BERT model

Ji et al (AAAI 2020). Is BERT really robust? a strong baseline for natural language attack on text classification and entailment



More Attacks: 3D Point Cloud Models




Adversarial attacks on multiple **3D Point Cloud** models by slightly perturbing the locations of the points

Hamdi et al (ECCV 2020). AdvPC: Transferable Adversarial Perturbations on 3D Point Clouds



More Attacks: Audio Recognition Systems



Imperceptible adversarial examples can be generated to fool **Audio Recognition Systems** including Google Speech, Bing Speech, IBM Speech APIs, etc

Hadi et al (DNSS 2020). Practical Hidden Voice Attacks against Speech and Speaker Recognition Systems





- Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART): https://github.com/Trusted-AI/adversarial-robustness-toolbox
- Foolbox Native: Fast adversarial attacks to benchmark the robustness of machine learning models in PyTorch, TensorFlow, and JAX https://github.com/bethgelab/foolbox
- CleverHans: https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans
- Advbox Family: https://github.com/advboxes/AdvBox




- Huang, Xiaowei, et al. "A survey of safety and trustworthiness of deep neural networks: Verification, testing, adversarial attack and defence, and interpretability." Computer Science Review 37 (2020): 100270.
- Hao-Chen, Han Xu Yao Ma, et al. "Adversarial attacks and defenses in images, graphs and text: A review." International Journal of Automation and Computing 17.2 (2020): 151-178.
- Akhtar, Naveed, and Ajmal Mian. "Threat of adversarial attacks on deep learning in computer vision: A survey." IEEE Access 6 (2018): 14410-14430.



49

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Adversarial attacks are important

- Understanding the limitation, or potential safety risks of deep learning models
- Providing a way to practically evaluate robustness performance of deep learning models under adversarial environments
- Issues:
 - It cannot provide robustness guarantees in terms of excluding adversarial examples
 - Attacks alone cannot directly improve the robustness

▶ How can we improve its robustness? → Part-2: Defence

► How to assess the adversarial robustness with provable guarantees → Part-3: Verification



Introduction

Adversarial Attacks

Algorithms for Adversarial Attacks More Examples of Adversarial Attacks

Defence through Adversarial Training

Adversarial Training Distributional Robustness Robustness vs Generalisation

Verification in Practice

Conclusions and Future Directions



Defence through Adversarial Training



Adversarial Defence

A fast growing research area:

Input denoising

 \diamond e.g., Guo et al (2017); Buckman et al (2018); Liao et al (2018); Samangouei et al (2018); Bai et al (2019); etc.

Randomised smoothing

 \diamond e.g., Lecuyer et al (2019); Li et al (2019); Cohen et al (2019); Salman et al (2019); Levine & Feizi (2020); Lee et al (2019); Teng et al (2020); Zhang et al (2020); etc.

Adversarial training

Training dataset augmentation

 \diamond e.g., Goodfellow et al (2014); Shaham et al (2018); Sabour et al (2015); Kurakin et al (2016); Papernot et al (2016); Dezfooli et al (2016); etc.

Robust optimisation

 \diamond e.g., Goodfellow et al (2015); Madry et al (2017); Zhang et al (2019); Miyato et al (2018); Wang et al (2019); etc.

Attack vs. Defence: An Endless Game

Adversarial attacks cause a Many defenses have been tried and catastrophic reduction in ML capability failed to generalize to new attacks Attack Defense Top ImageNet 100 Approximation attacks finishers GANs (Athalve et al. 2018) 90 (Samangouei et al., 2018) 80 Detection Accuracy (%) 70 (Ma et al., 2018) **Optimization attacks** 60 (Carlini, 2017) 50 Distillation 40 30 (Papernot et al., 2016) 20 Multi-stage attacks Adversarial attacks (Kurakin, 2016) 10 Adversarial training 0 (Goodfellow et al., 2015) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Single Step attacks Challenge Year (Goodfellow, 2014) ImageNet Classification Attack / Defense Cycle



36.99%

Adversarial Training Survives

- ► Athalye et al (ICML 2018). Obfuscated Gradients Give a False Sense of Security.
- Successful attack of 7 out of 9 defense in ICLR 2018
- ► The only survival is **adversarial training**

Defense	Dataset	Distance	Accuracy
Buckman et al. (2018)	CIFAR	$0.031 \ (\ell_{\infty})$	0%*
Ma et al. (2018)	CIFAR	$0.031 (\ell_{\infty})$	5%
Guo et al. (2018)	ImageNet	$0.005 \ (\ell_2)$	0%*
Dhillon et al. (2018)	CIFAR	$0.031 \ (\ell_{\infty})$	0%
Xie et al. (2018)	ImageNet	$0.031 (\ell_{\infty})$	0%*
Song et al. (2018)	CIFAR	$0.031 \ (\ell_{\infty})$	9%*
Samangouei et al.	MNIST	$0.005 (\ell_2)$	65%
(2018)			Ilyas et al 2019
Madry et al. (2018)	CIFAR	$0.031 (\ell_{\infty})$	47%
Na et al. (2018)	CIFAR	$0.015(\ell_{\infty})$	15%





Introduction

Adversarial Attacks

Algorithms for Adversarial Attacks More Examples of Adversarial Attacks

Defence through Adversarial Training

Adversarial Training

Distributional Robustness Robustness vs Generalisation

Verification in Practice

Conclusions and Future Directions



Defence through Adversarial Training

Adversarial Training



- Madry et al (ICLR 2018). Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks.
- Idea: solving a minimax optimisation problem through SGD training

 $\min_{\theta} \{ \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[\max_{x'\in S_x} L(x',y;\theta)] \},\$

- $\blacktriangleright~(x,y)$ clean training data samples $x\in \mathbb{R}^n$ with labels $y\in [k]$ drawn from the dataset $\mathcal D$
- $\blacktriangleright \ L(\cdot)$ loss function with model parameter $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^m$
- x' ∈ ℝⁿ perturbed samples in a feasible region S_x ≜ {z : z ∈ B(x, ε) ∩ [-1.0, 1.0]ⁿ}
 e.g., B(z, ε) ≜ {z : ||x - z||_p ≤ ε} - the ℓ_p-ball at center x with radius ε.



Outer minimisation can be simulated by SGD training

$$\min_{\theta} \{ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} [\max_{x' \in S_x} L(x', y; \theta)] \},\$$

How to compute gradient of a maximisation?

Danskin's Theorem

$$\nabla_{\theta} \max L(x', y; \theta) = \nabla_{\theta} L(x^*, y; \theta)$$

where $x^* = \arg \max L(x', y; \theta)$

- lnner maximisation $\max_{x' \in S_x} L(x', y; \theta)$ can be simulated by finding the worst-case adversarial attacks:
 - Fast Gradient Method (FGM)
 - Projected Gradient Method (PGM):

 Goodfellow et al (2014). Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv:1412.6572.

► Idea: Projecting perturbation onto the direction of gradient ascent of loss function

► Adversarial examples:

$$x^* = \arg \max_{x' \in S_x} \langle x' - x, \nabla_{\theta} L(x, y; \theta) \rangle$$

For ℓ_{∞} -norm, FGM recovers the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) where each data point (x, y) is perturbed by the ϵ -normalised sign vector of the loss's gradient

$$x^* = x + \epsilon \cdot \operatorname{sgn}(\nabla_{\theta} L(x, y; \theta))$$



- ▶ Kurakin et al (2016). Adversarial machine learning at scale. arXiv:1611.01236.
- Idea: Iterative gradient ascent to generate strongest adversarial examples, followed by projection back to the feasible region
- Updating rule:

$$x^{t+1} = \Pi_{S_x}(x^t + \alpha \cdot \operatorname{sgn}(\nabla_x L(x^t, y; \theta))),$$

where $\Pi_{S_x}(\cdot)$ projects the inputs onto the region S_x .



AT Variants

- ► FreeAT:
 - ► Shafahi et al (NeurIPS 2019). Adversarial training for free!
 - https://github.com/ashafahi/free_adv_train/
- ► YOPO:
 - Zhang et al (NeurIPS 2019). You only propagate once: Accelerating adversarial training via maximal principle.

- https://github.com/a1600012888/Y0P0-You-Only-Propagate-Once
- FreeLB:
 - Zhu et al (ICLR 2020). FreeLB: enhanced adversarial training for language understanding.
 - https://github.com/zhuchen03/FreeLB
- FastAT
 - ▶ Wong et al (ICLR 2020). Fast is better than free: Revisiting adversarial training.
 - https://github.com/locuslab/fast_adversarial

Pros:

- Empirical robustness (although no robust certificate)
- Without affecting inference time (although increasing the training time)
- Integratable to different threat models

Cons:

- Sacrifice accuracy to robustness
- Dedicated to supervised learning
- Rely very much on identifying local adversarial examples for specific threat models
- No guarantees of generalisation performance

Rethinking Adversarial Training

The min-max optimisation problem

$$\min_{\theta} \{ \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[\max_{x'\in S_x} L(x',y;\theta)] \},\$$

where robustness is the goal.

How shall we deal with the following?

- Robustness vs Accuracy
- Supervised vs Semi-supervised Learning
- Local vs Global Information
- Robustness vs Generalisation



Introduction

Adversarial Attacks

Algorithms for Adversarial Attacks More Examples of Adversarial Attacks

Defence through Adversarial Training

Adversarial Training Distributional Robustness

Robustness vs Generalisation

Verification in Practice

Conclusions and Future Directions



Defence through Adversarial Training

Distributional Robustness



 Sinha et al (ICLR 2018). Certifying some distributional robustness with principled adversarial training.

Idea: Considering a Lagrangian penalty formulation of perturbing the underlying data distribution in a Wasserstein ball


$$\min_{\theta} \sup_{P \in \mathcal{P}} \quad \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim P}[L(x,y;\theta) - \gamma W_c(P,P_0)] \\ s.t. \quad W_c(P,P_0) \triangleq \inf_{M \in \Pi(P,P_0)} \mathbb{E}_M c(Z,Z')$$

where P_0 is data-generating distribution, P is the perturbed distribution from P_0 such that $\mathcal{P} = \{P : W_c(P, P_0) \leq \rho\}$, $W_c(\cdot, \cdot)$ is Wasserstein metric, c(Z, Z') is the transport cost from Z to Z', and M is certain measure.

- Zhang et al (ICML 2019). Theoretically principled trade-off between robustness and accuracy.
- Idea: optimizing a regularised surrogate loss

 $\min_{\theta} \{ \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[L(x,y;\theta) + \beta \max_{x'\in B(x,\epsilon)} \mathrm{KL}(f(x)||f(x'))] \},\$

empirical loss minimisation: maximise the natural accuracy
 regularization term: push the decision boundary away from the data, so as to improve adversarial robustness



- Miyato et al (TPAMI 2018). Virtual adversarial training: a regularisation method for supervised and semi-supervised learning.
- Idea: regularise on local distributional smoothness (LDS)
- Virtual adversarial loss with "virtual" label: The distance of the conditional label distributions around each input data point against local perturbation

$$\begin{split} \min_{\theta} \quad & \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}_l}L(x,y;\theta) + \alpha \mathbb{E}_{x_*\sim\mathcal{D}_l\cup\mathcal{D}_{ul}}LDS(x_*;\theta) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & LDS(x_*;\theta) \triangleq D(p(\cdot|x_*;\hat{\theta})||p(\cdot|x_*+r_{\mathsf{vadv}};\theta)) \\ & r_{\mathsf{vadv}} = \arg\max_{\|r\|_2 \leq \epsilon} D(p(\cdot|x_*;\hat{\theta})||p(\cdot|x_*+r)) \end{split}$$

Virtual adversarial direction: A direction of the adversarial perturbation that alter the output distribution at most.

- Zhang and Wang (NeurIPS 2019). Defense against adversarial attacks using feature scattering-based adversarial training.
 - Motivation: Vanilla adversarial training generates adversarial examples one by one separately, without considering inter-sample relationship
 - Idea: Generating adversarial examples by perturbing the local neighborhood structure in an unsupervised fashion using feature scattering, and then performing model training with the generated adversarial examples
 - Feature scattering: Maximizing the feature matching distance between the clean samples and the perturbed samples in the latent space.

Drawbacks

- ► Feature scattering only considers the inter-sample relationship within the batch
- Biased towards the decision boundary, which potentially corrupts the structure of the original data distribution

Question: How could global data manifold information play a role?



▶ Robust optimization with *f*-divergence regularization

$$\begin{split} \min_{\theta} & \{ \mathbb{E}_{f_{\theta}(x^{adv}) \sim P_{\theta}^{*}}[l(f_{\theta}(x^{adv}), y)] + D_{f}(P_{\theta}^{*}||Q_{\theta}) \} \\ \text{s.t.} & P_{\theta}^{*} = \arg\max_{P_{\theta} \in \mathcal{P}}[D_{f}(P_{\theta}||Q_{\theta})] \end{split}$$

where $D_f(\cdot)$ is the *f*-divergence measure of two distributions, Q_{θ} is the underlying distribution of the latent features of clean samples, and P_{θ} is the underlying distribution of the latent features of adversarial perturbations.

Feasible region for the latent distribution

$$\mathcal{P} = \{P : f_{\theta}(x') \sim P \text{ subject to } \forall x \sim Q_0, x' \in B(x, \epsilon)\}$$

is induced by the set of perturbed examples through $f_{\theta}(\cdot)$.



Adversarial Training with Latent Distribution (ATLD)


49

 Idea: (1) Leverage a discriminator network for estimating the *f*-divergence between two distributions; (2) Generate Latent Manifold Adversarial Examples (LMAEs) to 'deceive' the latent manifold rather than fool the classifier

$$\begin{split} \min_{\theta} \Big\{ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \underbrace{L(x_{i}^{adv}, y_{i}; \theta)}_{L_{f}} + \sup_{W} \sum_{i=1}^{N} [\underbrace{\log D_{W}^{0}(f_{\theta}(x_{i}^{adv})) + (1 - \log D_{W}^{0}(f_{\theta}(x_{i})))}_{L_{d}^{0}}] \\ &+ \min_{W} [\underbrace{l(D_{W}^{1:C}(f_{\theta}(x_{i})), y_{i}) + l(D_{W}^{1:C}(f_{\theta}(x_{i}^{adv})), y_{i})]}_{L_{d}^{1:C}} \Big\} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad x_{i}^{adv} = \arg\max_{x_{i}' \in B(x_{i}, \epsilon)} [\log D_{W}^{0}(f_{\theta}(x_{i}')) + (1 - \log D_{W}^{0}(f_{\theta}(x_{i})))]. \end{split}$$

where D_W denotes the discriminator network with parameter W, D_W^0 and $D_W^{1:C}$ are the different dimensions of the output of the discriminator $E \times ETER$


ATLD as an Adversarial Game



Adversarial game between a discriminator and a classifier:

- Discriminator is learned to differentiate globally the latent distributions of the natural data and the perturbed counterpart
- Classifier is trained to recognize accurately the perturbed examples as well as enforcing the invariance between the two latent distributions EXETER

ATLD: Data Manifold and Decision Boundary





Introduction

Adversarial Attacks

Algorithms for Adversarial Attacks More Examples of Adversarial Attacks

Defence through Adversarial Training

Adversarial Training Distributional Robustness Robustness vs Generalisation

Verification in Practice

Conclusions and Future Directions



Defence through Adversarial Training

Robustness vs Generalisation



Standard regularisation techniques work for adversarial training to enhance generalisation performance

- Dropout
- ► Weight decay
- Data augmentation
- Early stopping

Q: Are there any weight regularisation techniques for generalisation that could be particularly suitable for adversarial training?

- Spectral normalisation
- Lipschitz regularisation
- Weight correction regularisation




Spectral Normalisation

- Miyato et al (ICLR 2018). Spectral normalization for generative adversarial networks.
 - Spectral normalisation: Normalising weight matrix by spectral norm, i.e., $W_{SN} = \frac{W}{\sigma(W)}$ where

$$\sigma(\mathbf{W}) \triangleq \max_{\|\mathbf{x}\|_2 \le 1} \|\mathbf{W}\mathbf{x}\|_2$$

► Farnia et al (ICLR 2019). Generalizable adversarial training via spectral normalization.



Lipschitz constraints under ℓ_2 -norm are useful for provable adversarial robustness bounds, stable training, and Wasserstein distance estimation.

- Cisse et al (ICML 2017). Parseval networks: Improving robustness to adversarial examples.
 - Idea: to maintain weight matrices of linear and convolutional layers to be (approximately) Parseval tight frames (extensions of orthogonal matrices to non-square matrices).
- Li et al (NeurIPS 2019). Preventing gradient attenuation in lipschitz constrained convolutional networks.
 - Idea: to introduce convolutional gradient norm preserving networks with an efficient parameterisation of orthogonal convolutions to avoid the issues of loose bounds on the Lipschitz constant and computational intractability



• Weight Correlation: Given weight matrix $\mathbf{W}_l \in \mathbb{R}^{N_{l-1} \times N_l}$ of the *l*-th layer, the average weight correlation is defined as

$$\rho(\mathbf{W}_l) = \frac{1}{N_l(N_l-1)} \sum_{\substack{i,j=1\\i\neq j}}^{N_l} \frac{|\mathbf{w}_{l,i}^T \mathbf{w}_{l,j}|}{||\mathbf{w}_{l,i}||_2 ||\mathbf{w}_{l,j}||_2},$$

where $\mathbf{w}_{l,i}$ and $\mathbf{w}_{l,j}$ are *i*-th and *j*-th column of \mathbf{W}_l , corresponding to the *i*-th and *j*-th neuron at *l*-th layer, respectively. Intuitively, $\rho(\mathbf{W}_l)$ is the average cosine similarity between weight vectors of any two neurons at the *l*-th layer.

- ► Weight Correlation Regularisation
 - Idea: Regularisation to constrain the average weight correlation between any two neurons so as to enhance generalisation performance

Jin et al (NeurIPS 2020). How does Weight Correlation Affect the Generalisation Ability of Deep Neural Networks.

• Adversarial training vs norm regularisation

- Roth et al (NeurIPS 2020). Adversarial training is a form of data-dependent operator norm regularization.
- ▶ Insight: ℓ_p -norm constrained projected gradient ascent based adversarial training with an ℓ_q -norm loss on the logits of clean and perturbed inputs is equivalent to data-dependent (p, q) operator norm regularization
- Distributionally robust optimisation (DRO) vs regularisation
 - Husain (NeurIPS 2020). Distributional robustness with IPMs and links to regularization and GANs.
 - Insight: DRO under any choice of Integral Probability Metrics (IPM) corresponds to a family of regularization penalties, which recover and improve upon existing results in the setting of Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) and Wasserstein distances.

81

Generalisation error:

 $\operatorname{GE} \triangleq |l(f_{\theta}(S), Y) - \hat{l}(f_{\theta}(S_d), Y_d)|$

where $l(f_{\theta}(S), Y) \triangleq \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim(S,Y)}[l(f_{\theta}(x), y)]$ and $\hat{l}(f_{\theta}(S_d), Y_d) \triangleq \frac{1}{|S_d|} \sum_{(x_d, y_d) \in S_d} l(f_{\theta}(x_d), y_d)$ with S_d, Y_d being the training data and the corresponding labels, respectively, and S, Y being the underlying data and label distributions, respectively.

Robust generalisation error:

$$\text{RGE} \triangleq |l(f_{\theta}(S^{adv}), Y) - \hat{l}(f_{\theta}(S^{adv}_{d}), Y_{d})|$$

where S_d^{adv} and S^{adv} are the set of adversarial examples for the training set and its underlying distribution.

82

- Schmidt et al (NeurIPS 2018). Adversarially robust generalization requires more data.
 - Sample complexity of robust learning >> sample complexity of "standard" learning — the gap holds irrespective of training algorithms or models
- Yin et al (ICML 2019). Rademacher complexity for adversarially robust generalization.
 - Adversarial Rademacher complexity is larger than its natural counterpart
 - \blacktriangleright It has an unavoidable dimension dependence, unless the weight vector has bounded ℓ_1 norm
- ▶ Raghunathan et al (2019). Adversarial training can hurt generalization.
 - Adversarial training hurts generalisation even when the optimal predictor has both optimal standard and robust accuracy

Question: Why is robust generalisation hard to achieve and how to improve it?



Given the training set $S_d = \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n$ drawn from a distribution S with K classes, and the corresponding adversarial example set $S_d^{adv} = \{x_i^{adv}\}_{i=1}^n$ drawn from the underlying distribution S^{adv} , if the loss function $l(\cdot)$ of DNN f_{θ} is κ -Lipschitz, then for any $\delta > 0$, with the probability at least $1 - \delta$

$$\text{RGE} \le \text{GE} + \frac{\kappa}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \sum_{j \in N_i} \|d_{\theta}(x_j^{adv}) - \hat{d}_{\theta}(z, C_i)\|_2^2 + M \sqrt{\frac{2K \ln 2 + 2\ln \frac{1}{\delta}}{n}}$$

where
$$\begin{aligned} d_{\theta}(x^{adv}) &= f_{\theta}(x^{adv}) - f_{\theta}(x) \\ \hat{d}_{\theta}(z,C_i) &= \mathbb{E}[f_{\theta}(z^{adv}) - f_{\theta}(z) | z \in C_i] \end{aligned}$$

with N_i being the set of index of training data for class i, C_i the set of i^{th} class data of the whole set and z is data sampled from C_i with corresponding adversarial example z^{adv} , M the upper bound of loss of the whole data manifold S.

Adversarial Training with Shift Consistency Regularisation (AT-SCR)

$$\min_{\theta} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{n} [L(x_i^{adv}, y_i; \theta)] + \frac{\lambda}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \sum_{j \in N_i} \widehat{\operatorname{SiC}}(x_j^{adv}, x_l, N_i) \right\},$$
s.t. $x_i^{adv} = \arg\max_{x_i' \in S_{x_i}} L(x_i', y_i; \theta).$

where

$$\widehat{\operatorname{SiC}}(x_j^{adv}, x_l, N_i) \triangleq \|d_{\theta}(x_j^{adv}) - \bar{d}_{\theta}(x_l, N_i)\|_2^2,$$


where $\bar{d}_{\theta}(x_l, N_i)$ is the average feature shifts over training data of class *i*, i.e.,

$$\bar{d}_{\theta}(x_l, N_i) = \frac{1}{|N_i|} \sum_{l \in N_i} (f_{\theta}(x_l^{adv}) - f_{\theta}(x_l)).$$

$$E \in \text{ETER} \quad \textcircled{UNIVERSITY OF}_{\text{LIVERPOOL}}$$



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Zhang et al (ICML 2021). Towards Better Robust Generalization with Shift Consistency Regularization. UNIVERSITY OF



Distributional robustness is more preferable for adversarial training

- trade-off between robustness and accuracy
- both supervised and semi-supervised learning
- both local and global information

Robustness vs generalisation

- Regularisation techniques could benefit both robustness and generalisation simultaneously
- Robust generalisation requires rethinking latent dispersion of clean and adversarial examples





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Verification in Practice


Conclusions and Future Directions



Verification in Practice







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More properties to be verified.

- robustness local property for input perturbation
- generalisation global property for unseen data
- security properties such as backdoor
- Different ways of expressing whether or not a model is dependable.
 - confirm whether or not a property holds
 - finding counterexamples
 - statistical evaluation
 - Iower/upper bounds of a certain quantity

91

Scalable to work with real-world neural networks

- different types of layers and activation functions
- large network (depth, width, etc)
- Concerns all inputs that may appear in operational time
 - Reliability, which describes the ability of a system or component to function under stated conditions for a specified period of time.



To be included in this tutorial:

- For local properties such as robustness
 - Global optimisation based methods converging bounds
 - Sampling based methods statistical bounds
 - Testing methods use metrics to decide if the tests are sufficient

► For reliability


Assessment method based on the production of (global) generalisation and (local) robustness

Verification in Practice

 $\hookrightarrow\!\!\operatorname{Converging}$ Bounds Methods



General idea of converging bounds method





[Huang et al., 2017] (CAV2017) Safety verification of deep neural networks.

[Wicker et al., 2018] (TACAS2018) Feature-guided black-box safety testing of deep neural networks

[Ruan et al., 2018] (IJCAI2018) Reachability Analysis of Deep Neural Networks with Provable Guarantees.

[Ruan et al., 2019] (IJCAI2019) Global Robustness Evaluation of Deep Neural Networks with Provable Guarantees for the Hamming Distance,

[Wu et al., 2020] (Theoretical Computer Science, 2020) A game-based approximate verification of deep neural networks with provable guarantees.



96

The following layers are Lipschitz continuous:


- convolutional with ReLU activation functions,
- ▶ fully connected layers with ReLU activation functions,
- max pooling
- contrast-normalization
- softmax (proved in this paper)
- sigmoid (proved in this paper)
- Hyperbolic tangent (proved in this paper)

Cover all layers used in e.g., image classification networks.

97

Let $o:[0,1]^m\to\mathbb{R}$ be a Lipschitz continuous function statistically evaluating the outputs of the network.

Connect the network f with function o, i.e., o(f(x))





Let $X' \subseteq [0,1]^n$ be an input subspace and $f : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^m$ a network. The reachability of f over the function o under an error tolerance $\epsilon \ge 0$ is a set $R(o, X', \epsilon) = [l, u]$ such that

$$l \ge \inf_{x' \in X'} o(f(x')) - \epsilon \text{ and } u \le \sup_{x' \in X'} o(f(x')) + \epsilon.$$
(4)

We write $u(o, X', \epsilon) = u$ and $l(o, X', \epsilon) = l$ for the upper and lower bound, respectively.



The instantiation of the o function will enable us to express several problems with a single formalism.

- output range analysis
- safety/robustness verification
- robustness comparison between networks and input subregions



• (Safety Definition) A network f is safe with respect to an input x and an input subspace $X' \subseteq [0, 1]^n$ with $x \in X'$ if

$$\forall x' \in X' : \arg\max_{j} c_j(x') = \arg\max_{j} c_j(x)$$
(5)

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• (Instantiation for safety) A network f is safe with respect to x and X' s.t. $x \in X'$ if and only if

 $u(\oplus, X', \epsilon) \le 0$

where $j = \arg \max_j c_j(x)$, $\oplus(c_1, ..., c_m) = \max_{i \in \{1...m\}} (\prod_i (c_1, ..., c_m) - \prod_j (c_1, ..., c_m))$. The error bound of the safety decision problem by this reduction is 2ϵ . Let $w = o \cdot f$. The computation of the minimum value is reduced to solving the following optimization problem with guaranteed convergence to the global minimum.

$$\min_{x} \quad w(x), \quad s.t. \quad x \in [a, b]^n \tag{6}$$

The maximization problem can be transferred into a minimization problem.





Design another continuous function h(x,y), which serves as a lower bound of the original function w(x). Specifically, we need

$$h(x,y) \le w(x), \ \forall x, y \in [a,b]^n, \ h(x,x) = w(x)$$
 (7)

Furthermore, for $i \ge 0$, we let $\mathcal{Y}_i = \{y_0, y_1, ..., y_i\}$ be a finite set containing i + 1 points from the input space $[a, b]^n$, and let $\mathcal{Y}_i \subseteq \mathcal{Y}_k$ when k > i, then we can define a function $H(x; \mathcal{Y}_i) = \max_{y \in \mathcal{Y}_i} h(x, y)$ which satisfies the following relation:

$$H(x; \mathcal{Y}_i) < H(x; \mathcal{Y}_k) \le w(x) \tag{8}$$





We use $l_i = \inf_{x \in [a,b]^n} H(x; \mathcal{Y}_i)$ to denote the minimum value of $H(x; \mathcal{Y}_i)$ for $x \in [a,b]^n$. Then we have

$$l_0 < l_1 < \dots < l_{i-1} < l_i \le \inf_{x \in [a,b]^n} w(x)$$

Similarly, we need a sequence of upper bounds u_i to have

$$l_0 < \dots < l_i \le \inf_{x \in [a,b]^n} w(x) \le u_i < \dots < u_0$$
(9)

104


By Expression (9), we can have the following:

$$\lim_{i \to \infty} l_i = \min_{x \in [a,b]^n} w(x) \text{ and } \lim_{i \to \infty} (u_i - l_i) = 0$$
(10)

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One-dimensional Optimisation

Let h(x, y) = w(y) - K|x - y|



105

JVERP

NN	Layer	Neutron	Time by	Time by	Our
ID	No.	No.	SHERLOCK	Reluplex	method
<i>N-0</i>	1	100	1.9s	1m 55s	0.4s
N-1	1	200	2.4s	13m 58s	1.0s
N-2	1	500	17.8s	Timeout	6.8s
N-3	1	500	7.6s	Timeout	5.3s
N-4	1	1000	7m 57.8s	Timeout	1.8s
N-5	6	250	9m 48.4s	Timeout	15.1s

 $\operatorname{Figure:}$ Comparison with SHERLOCK and Reluplex

Computational complexity is NP-complete over the input dimension, instead of number of neurons.

Verification in Practice

 $\hookrightarrow Sampling-based Methods$



CLEVER [Weng et al., 2018]

- \blacktriangleright A lower bound of L_p minimum adversarial distortion β_L
- Extreme Value Theory ensures that the maximum value of random variables can only follow one of the three extreme value distributions.

[Weng et al., 2018] (ICLR2018) Evaluating The Robustness Of Neural Networks: An Extreme Value Theory Approach



- ▶ a naive Monte Carlo sampling does not work well for high-dimensional problems.
- an adaptation of multi-level splitting, a Monte Carlo approach for estimating the probability of rare events.

[Webb et al., 2019] (ICLR2019) A Statistical Approach To Assessing Neural Network Robustness

Verification in Practice

 $\hookrightarrow \text{Software Testing Methods}$



- Well established in many industrial standard for software used in safety critical systems, such as ISO26262 for automotive systems and DO 178B/C for avionic systems.
- Coverage Metrics
 - structural coverage
 - scenario coverage
- Test Case Generation Methods
 - fuzzing
 - symbolic execution, etc
- to determine if the generated test cases include bugs.



- Industrial standards need to be upgraded
- ► A few Coverage Metrics [Pei et al., 2017, Sun et al., 2019]
- ► A few Test Case Generation Methods [Sun et al., 2018]
- Use a set of generated test cases to either finding bugs or evaluating the performance of a neural network

[Pei et al., 2017] (SOSP2017) DeepXplore: Automated Whitebox Testing of Deep Learning Systems.

[Sun et al., 2019] (EMSOFT2019) Structural Test Coverage Criteria for Deep Neural Networks. [Sun et al., 2018] (ASE2018) Concolic Testing for Deep Neural Networks.






- Neuron Coverage [Pei et al., 2017]: to make sure that all neurons have been activated in at least one of the test cases
- boundary coverage : to make sure the boundary values of each neuron is reached.
- MC/DC coverage [Sun et al., 2019]: to make sure that every neuron in a layer can independently activate the neurons in the next layer.



The core idea of our criteria is to ensure that not only the presence of a feature needs to be tested but also the effects of less complex features on a more complex feature must be tested.




For example, check the impact of $n_{2,1}, n_{2,2}, n_{2,3}$ on $n_{3,1}$.



115

(Sign Change of a neuron) Given a neuron $n_{k,l}$ and two test cases x_1 and x_2 , we say that the sign change of $n_{k,l}$ is exploited by x_1 and x_2 , denoted as $sc(n_{k,l}, x_1, x_2)$, if $sign(v_{k,l}[x_1]) \neq sign(v_{k,l}[x_2])$.






A neuron pair $(n_{k,i}, n_{k+1,j})$ are two neurons in adjacent layers k and k+1 such that $1 \le k \le K-1$, $1 \le i \le s_k$, and $1 \le j \le s_{k+1}$.

A neuron pair $\alpha = (n_{k,i}, n_{k+1,j})$ is SS-covered by two test cases x_1, x_2 , denoted as $SS(\alpha, x_1, x_2)$, if the following conditions are satisfied by the network instances $\mathcal{N}[x_1]$ and $\mathcal{N}[x_2]$:

- ► $sc(n_{k,i}, x_1, x_2);$
- $\begin{tabular}{l} & \neg sc(n_{k,l},x_1,x_2) \mbox{ for all } \\ & n_{k,l} \in P_k \setminus \{i\}; \end{tabular} \end{tabular}$

► $sc(n_{k+1,j}, x_1, x_2).$



Then, what is the state-of-the-art on DNN Verification?

Robustness

What is the actual need for certification?

▶ Reliability, e.g., the probability of no failure at all in the next prediction.



Verification in Practice

 \hookrightarrow Reliability Assessment






Reliability is required by industrial standards

- \blacktriangleright consider e.g., the probability of no failure at all for the next 10^k input
- safety integrity levels (SIL1 SIL4), as in IEC 61508 standard for "Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/ Programmable Electronic Safety-related Systems"
- From Robustness to Reliability? [Zhao et al., 2020]
 - We do not know what the next input will be.
 - Generalisability!

[Zhao et al., 2020] (SafeCOMP2020) A Safety Framework for Critical Systems Utilising Deep Neural Networks






Note: far away from known data \neq far away from boundary



What do we already have?





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What is reliability in the context of deep learning?

 $\mathsf{Reliability} = \mathsf{Generalisation} \times \mathsf{Robustness}$

i.e., we have the following definition for reliability [Zhao et al., 2021]

$$\lambda := \sum_{x \in \mathcal{D}} I_{\{x \text{ causes a failure}\}}(x) Op(x) \tag{11}$$

where Op(x) captures the uncertainty of "which one would be the next input".


[Zhao et al., 2021] (AlSafety2021) Assessing the Reliability of Deep Learning Classifiers Through Robustness Evaluation and Operational Profiles



► This requires to verify

- Op(x): Probability Density Estimation, and
- I(x): the robustness of the possible inputs, which can be done with DNN verification
- based on an assumption that different inputs' local robustness are independent.
- ▶ i.e., we need to explore a partition of the input space, and use Op(x) to weight the verification results of cells






Binning, to partition the input space as cells

► r-separation [Yang et al., 2020]: a data distribution over U_{i∈C} Xⁱ is r-separable if for all i, j ∈ C

 $\min_{x \in \mathcal{X}^i, x' \in \mathcal{X}^j} dist(x, x') \ge 2r$

use r as the radius of the cells



need a balance between cost vs precision

How to evaluate reliability?

$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	0.04
Synth. DS-1 0.0037/0.0800 0.004392 0.004 250 × 250 0.008025 0.008290 0.000014 0.008	
	9 0.03
Synth. DS-2 $0.0004/0.0079$ 0.002001 0.002 500×500 0.004739 0.005249 0.000002 0.005249	52 0.04
MNIST 0.0051/0.0235 0.1003 0.100 top-170000 0.106615 0.036517 /	0.43
CIFAR10 0.0199/0.0853 0.1947 0.125 top-23000 0.238138 0.234419 / /	6.74

Table 1: The RAM details and results. For image datasets, the r, ϵ and # are associated with latent spaces. Time is in seconds per cell.

 $\ensuremath{\operatorname{Figure:}}$ Part of the results for Siemens' Artificial Intelligence Dependability Assessment challenge.

How to make the estimation more precise?

- Iocal robustness computation cannot be speed up.
- So, deal with networks with better generalisability! How?





Considering an important open question – Is there any structural information that can be utilised to determine the generalisation ability of deep neural networks? [Jin et al., 2020]


[Jin et al., 2020] (NeurIPS2020) How does Weight Correlation Affect the Generalisation Ability of Deep Neural Networks.







(McAllester, 1999) considers a generalization bound on the parameters



KL divergence plays a key role in the generalization bound

- a small KL term will help tighten the bound
- a larger KL term will loose the bound

EXETER

- Relax the i.i.d. assumption on the posterior distribution, consider weight correlation, in order to achieve a tighter lower bound and a better prediction ability.
- Found that there are structural components that affect the generalisability of neural networks



PAC Bayes + Weight Correlation




Figure: **(FCN)** WC of any two neurons is the cosine similarity of the associated weight vectors. **(CNN)** WC of any two filters is the cosine similarity of the reshaped filter matrices.

[Jin et al., 2020] (NeurIPS2020) How does Weight Correlation Affect the Generalisation Ability of Deep Neural Networks.



Enable the design of new measure (in the next slide) which can serve as a strong/direct indicator of the generalisation. Roughly, lower weight correlation suggests a better PAC Bayes bound, i.e., smaller generalisation gap and better generalisation ability.



PAC Bayes + Weight Correlation

Table 1: Complexity Measures (Measured Quantities)

Generalisation Error (GE)	$\pounds_D(f_{ heta^F}) - \pounds_S(f_{ heta^F})$
Product of Frobenius Norms (PFN)	$\prod_{\ell} \ heta_{\ell}^F \ _{\mathrm{Fr}}$
Product of Spectral Norms (PSN)	$\prod_{\ell} \ \theta_{\ell}^{F}\ _{2}$
Number of Parameters (NoP)	Total number of parameters in the network
Sum of Spectral Norms (SoSP)	Total number of parameters $\times \sum_{\ell} \ \theta_{\ell}^0 - \theta_{\ell}^F\ _2$
Weight Correlation (WC)	$\frac{1}{\ell}\sum_{\ell}\rho(w_{\ell})$
PAC Bayes (PB)	$\sum_{\ell} \ \theta_{\ell}^{0} - \theta_{\ell}^{\ell}\ _{\mathrm{Fr}}^{2} / 2\sigma_{\ell}^{2}$ $\sum_{\ell} (\ \theta_{\ell}^{0} - \theta_{\ell}^{\ell}\ _{\mathrm{Fr}}^{2} / 2\sigma_{\ell}^{2} + \mathbf{g}(w_{\ell})) \bullet New measure$
PAC Bayes & Correlation (PBC)	$\sum_{\ell} (\ \hat{\theta}_{\ell}^{0} - \hat{\theta}_{\ell}^{F}\ _{\mathrm{Fr}}^{2} / 2\sigma_{\ell}^{2} + \mathbf{g}(w_{\ell}))$

Table 2: Complexity measures for CIFAR-10

Network	PFN	PSN	NoP	SoSP	PB	PBC	WC	GE
FCN1	8.1e7	1.4e4	3.7e7	1.6e9	1.1e4	1.14e5	0.297	2.056
FCN2	3.3e7	8.5e3	4.2e7	1.61e9	8.8e3	1.24e5	0.296	2.354
VGG11	8.5e10	1.4e5	9.7e6	2.4e8	2.0e3	3.41e4	0.273	0.929
VGG16	5.1e15	1.3e7	1.5e7	5.2e8	2.6e3	3.73e4	0.275	0.553
VGG19	1.1e19	2.9e8	2.1e7	8.1e8	3.3e3	4.26e4	0.274	0.678
ResNet18	2.5e22	1.1e12	1.1e7	8.4e8	4.7e3	1.34e5	0.732	2.681
ResNet34	9.9e34	4.9e16	2.1e7	3.1e9	1.0e4	1.30e5	0.733	2.552
ResNet50	1.4e76	7.5e46	2.3e7	6.1e9	1.6e7	1.62e7	0.278	2.807
DenseNet121	5.9e176	1.4e151	6.8e6	1.5e10	1.0e9	1.04e9	0.357	1.437
Concordant Pairs	21	21	22	26	24	29	24	-
Discordant Pairs	15	15	14	10	12	7	12	-
Kendall's τ	0.16	0.16	0.22	0.44	0.33	0.61	0.33	-



- Enable the design of new measure (in the next slide) which can serve as a strong indicator of the generalisation. Roughly, lower weight correlation suggests a better PAC Bayes bound, i.e., smaller generalisation gap and better generalisation ability.
- The training process by monitoring and adapting this measure can lead to models with better generalisation.

- Enable the design of new measure (in the next slide) which can serve as a strong indicator of the generalisation. Roughly, lower weight correlation suggests a better PAC Bayes bound, i.e., smaller generalisation gap and better generalisation ability.
- The training process by monitoring and adapting this measure can lead to models with better generalisation.
- Now close the loop: use structural information to improve the generalisation of neural network, on which reliability estimation is more accurate.

CETER



Introduction

Adversarial Attacks

Algorithms for Adversarial Attacks More Examples of Adversarial Attacks

Defence through Adversarial Training

Adversarial Training Distributional Robustness Robustness vs Generalisation

Verification in Practice

Conclusions and Future Directions



Conclusions and Future Directions




- ► Falsification through Attacks: identify risks
- Rectification through Defence: reduce risks
- Verification: prove the absence of risks





with Falsification/Rectification/Verification in mind,





93.84%

- A proper metric that is of high fidelity to human perception would be key for high-quality attacks
- Attacks essentially prove the non-robustness of the model, so combining attacks (or falsification) with verification could provide a more balanced and efficient way for certified robustness evaluation
- Developing black-box attacks that the adversary can only access the hard label with limited queries
- Exploring empirical and theoretical connections between adversarial robustness and interpretability
- Exploring adversarial attacks that can resemble a wide range of real-world adversarial instances/scenarios
- Attacking solutions that are independent of a certain distance metric (or workable on multiple distance metrics)
- The empirical and theoretical relations between universal attacks and global robustness (or robustness of model structure that is independent of concrete inputs)



Theoretical understanding of adversarial training

- What is the trade-off between robustness and accuracy?
- How to optimally integrate both local and global information?
- How does robustness interact with generalisation?
- ► Adversarial training for semi-supervised or unsupervised learning
- ► Adversarial training in the distributed learning scenarios, e.g., federated learning




- Verification for reliability (i.e., not only robustness),
- Verification of online learning,
- Improved scalability through e.g., abstraction,
- Training for verification: models that are easier to verify,
- etc.




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